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In addition to the cases above mentioned, which cite and follow
Crosby's and other similar cases, there are a few early ones which,
though also in accord with the English doctrine, do not cite any
of these cases, but seem to have been decided on general principles
of law. Such is State v. White, Charlton 123 (1807), which was
a commitment for contempt by an inferior court of record, and on
habeas corpus in the Supreme Court, it held that the lower court
had power to inflict punishment, at discretion, for all contempts of
their authority; that the Supreme Court would not, therefore, discharge such persons, and especially it would not discharge nor
admit to bail such persons, if officers of such courts. See, also,
Gist v. Bowman, 2 Bay 182, in the Supreme Court of South
Carolina. Recent decisions in Georgia and South Carolina, commented, infra, have modified the law in those states.
Ex parte Martin, 5 Yerger 456 (1830), was an appeal from a
county court to the circuit court, and a writ of error on the judgment of the latter court, from the Supreme Court, which held that
in a case of contempt no writ of error or appeal will lie, each
court being its own exclusive judge of what is a contempt. The
recent Code of Tennessee has changed this: Sanders v. Metcalf,
1 Tenn. Ch. 419; State v. Jroodfin, 5 Ired. 199; Ex parts
Summers, Id. 149.
CHARLES CHAUNCEY.
Philadelphia.

(To be continued.)

TRADE-MARKS.
THE recent decision of the Supreme Court of the United States

in In re United States v. Steffens, delivered in last October Term
1879, has created an agitation which has ever since disturbed the
public mind. That case has resolved that a trade-mark is not an
invention or discovery, within the meaning of the clause of the
constitution empowering Congress to secure to authors and inventors
the exclusive right to their inventions and discoveries: Leidersdorf
v. Flint,18 Am. Law Reg. (N. S.) 37, and 7 Cent. Law Jour. 405.
In Duwel v. Bohmer, at the April Term (1878) of the United
States Circuit Court of the Southern District of Ohio, the directly
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opposite view to that enunciated in .Leidersdorfv. Flint was held.
A further case in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, viz., Day
et al. v. Walls, 35 Legal Intelligencer 468, was dismissed upon
demurrer for want of jurisdiction, the parties being all citizens of
Pennsylvania; the opinion of DYER, J., in Leidersdorf v. Flint,
being acted upon by CADWALADER, J.
It was therefore high time that the opinion of the United States
Supreme Court should be taken; but notwithstanding the decision
just rendered by that tribunal the question at issue remains
practically unsettled.
It should be observed that all that the court was called upon to
decide was as to the validity of the Registration Act of 1870,
(sects. 4937-4947 R. S.), and its auxiliary of 1876 (an act to
punish the counterfeiting of trade-marks), under which indictments
had been found against two different parties, Emil Steffens and
Adolph Witteman, in the United States Circuit Court of the
Southern District of New York, and an information filed against
W. W. Johnson and others in the United States Circuit Court of
the Southern District of Ohio. In each court the judges disagreed,
and hence the appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States.
An effort was made by the attorney-general to maintain the
vaiidity of the Registration Act, as being comprised within the
olause of the constitution which authorizes Congress to "regulate
commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and
with the Indian tribes." But the United States Supreme Court
has decided, hypothetically, it must be admitted, that if trade-marks
are within congressional control at all,under the power to regulate
commerce, the existing statutes for their protection are invalid
because not limited in operation to the use of trade-marks in those
classes of commerce over which Congress is given control, viz.,
commerce with foreign nations, among the several states, and with
the Indian tribes.
This hypothesis is unfortunate, as it leaves the question at issue
still in legal doubt.
Further, in the opinion delivered by the court it is said, that the
Act of 1870 "is so framed that it is impossible to separate that
which has reference to commerce within its control and that which
has not; and as Congress certainly did not intend to pass the limited
registration law which such a construction would imply, the whole
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legislation must fall, as being void for want of constitutional
authority."
From the scope of this decision it would appear that the Registration Act of 1870 is void for want of precise words defining its
limitation, so as not to infringe the rights of the respective states,
and, unfortunately, as a consequence it is void as an international
as well as an inter-state piece of legislation.
It should be borne in mind that the Supreme Court, in rendering
its decision on November 18th 1879, had to construe a penal act,
that of August 14th 1876, which depended for its validity upon the
Registration Act of July.8th 1870, and the rule that all penal acts
must be construed strictly had to be applied. All that the court
had to decide was the validity of these two acts conjunctively.
Even if Congress possessed the power contended for, it should
have expressed it in a proper manner, and if these acts can only
be valid as regulating commerce they must be limited, and should
have been so expressed, to foreign and inter-state commerce, and
commerce with the Indian-tribes, and if not so limited in express
words, they exceed the power of Congress as an interference with
state rights.
The questions involved in the decision as to the property in trademarks by merchants, manufacturers and traders (no matter of what
nationality), and the legal protection to which they may be entitled
in maintenance of their civil rights, are wholly irrespective of the
right to institute criminal proceedings under the Registration Act
in conjunction with the Act of 1876. The right to, and property
m, a trade-mark attach at common law, and are not dependent on
any statute or act of Congress, neither must they be confounded
with the patent or copyright privileges which are creatures of
statute and regulated by acts of Congress. "The power given to
Congress," said DYER, J., in Leidersdorf v. .Flint, "to promote
the progress of science and useful arts is restricted to the rights
of authors and inventors, and further, their rights are only to be
secured for a limited time: Livingston v. Van Ingen, 9 Johns.
566. This limitation in time is imposed by the constitutional
provision itself. But the right to a trade-mark is of common-law
origin, and as a common-law right is limited only by the period of
its use, and ceases only with its, abandonment. Property in
inventions and discoveries did not exist at common law, and for
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their protection we have to look wholly to the constitutional pro.
vision on the subject."
Mr. Browne, in his treatise on trade-marks, says, quoting Story,
"A copyright is limited by time; a trade-mark is not. A copyright is limited tenritorially; but a trade-mark acknowledges no
boundaries. They are unlike in their natures."
"Property in a trade-mark," says Mr. Justice DYER, in the
Leidersdorf Case, "exists independently of statute. It is otherwise with inventions and discoveries. They, as is said by the
court in .Rodgers et al. v. Philip et al., I Off. Gas. 81, are protected only in consequence of the constitutional provision on the
subject, which does not apply to trade-marks."
"Among commercial nations," says Mr. Browne, in his work
above quoted, "there is a growing tendency to universal recognition
of the emblems of commerce known as trade marks :" sect. 802.
Even if trade-marks are under the constitutional control of
Congress at all, the statutes involved in the Supreme Court
decision cannot, according to that case, be supported to the extent
of the use of trade-marks because their language is general in its
operation; and Congress might have been unwilling to have passed
laws only partial in their operation; and in such cases it is impossible to separate the constitutional and unconstitutional parts of the
.statutes. Every nation and every state has within its own peculiar
jurisdiction an inherent power to deal civilly and criminally with
any infraction of the rights of property, but as between state and
state, nation and nation, or Indian tribes, the international element
must be regulated either by congresses, conventions or declarations
of nations, or, as far as relates to the United States alone, by the
National Congress or Federal power within the limits of the constitution itself; and an act of Congress that is not specific in confining within such limits its enactments, which affects too general
language in its operation, is naturally jealously regarded, and
where it assumes the nature of penal legislation is, very properly,
carefully scanned and strictly construed. But the invalidity of
such carelessly contrived acts by no means impairs the rights,
remedies and even penalties, whether at common law or imposed by
state statutes, which protect the property of every individual, be he
citizen or alien, from invasion, infringement or other interference.
"We find," says Mr. Upton, in his Treatise on the Law of Trademarks, "that property in trade-marks, exclusive and absolute, ha&
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existed and been recognised as a legal possession, which may be
bought and sold, and transmitted, from the earliest days of our
recorded jurisprudence :" Upton, p. 10.
It is said that the doctrine of exclusive property in tradE-marks,
has prevailed from the time of the Year Books, but however that
may be, and it is somewhat doubtful, it has certainly been acknowledged from the time of James I.
In the power of acquiring and possessing this species of property
there is no difference between citizens and aliens. In Taylor v.
Carpenter, 8 Story's Rep. 458, and 7 Law Reporter 437; also
Taylor v. Carpenter, 2 Woodbury & Minot 1, and 4 Barbour's
Abstract of Chancellors' Decisions 68, and fully reported in 2
Saund. Ch. Rep. 603-the former case in the Circuit Court of the
United States, in Massachusetts, before Justices STORY and WooDBURY, and the latter in the Court of Chancery in New York, and
subsequently on appeal in the Court of Errors-the plaintiff was
a subject of Great Britain, and the courts in these cases refused to
recognise the doctrine that the protection claimed should be granted
only to citizens. The case relied upon in the argument by the
defendant's counsel was that of Delrondre et al. v. Shaw, 2 Simons
237, where it was claimed that such protection to a foreigner, a
citizen of the United States, had been denied by the English
courts. But upon referring to that case it will be found that the
denial was limited to the "copyright of a foreigner." Subsequent
English cases have confirmed this view. In The Collin8 Co. v.
Brown, 8 Kay & Johnson 428, upon the objection of alienage being
made, it was held that foreigners were equally entitled to protection
with citizens, but that it was very doubtful if it should be withheld
even from alien enemies. Whatever doubt or misconstruction may
have been supposed to attach to the English decision in lDelrondre
v. Shaw has long since been dispelled, and now under the enactment of sect. 2 of 83 & 34 Viet., c. 14, "real and personal property of every As8rption may be taken, acquired, held and disposed
of by an alien in the same manner in all respects as by a natural
born British subject."
As Mr. Unton truly observes, "The right of property in trademarks does not partake in any degree of the nature and character
of a patent or copyright, to which it has sometimes been referred.
* * * The exclusive right of multiplying copies of original productions of the mind, -whether in the form of books, maps,
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engravings, designs or other of the manifold emanations of human
thought, expressed -by words or symbols, bears no appreciable
resemblance to a right of property in a mere name, figure, lettermark, device or symbol, when used as a designation of a thing.
The former, which is copyright property, is granted by express
statute. * * * 'The latter is a iight of property, neither created
nor controlled by any legislative enactment, but existing at common
law, independent of all statute provisions, which (recognising its
existence and the great importance of its protection beyond that
afforded it -by courts of civil jurisdiction) inflict the penalties of
- "
a misdemeanor upon its violation :" pp. 14 and 15,
among
at
least
much
misconception,
The patent theory has led to
the public laity, and confounded the new and original design, for
a manufacture, which, according to the Act of 1842, might have
been patented, with the mere designation of the manufactured
article. The mischief has arisen through granting patents- for
devices to be used as -mere designations of merchandise, to be
affixed either to the article itself, or to the package containing tt.
But it is obvious that no better or exclusive right t0 the use of'
such mark can be acquired by such a patent, than may be 'acquired'
by its adoption and appropriation by the manufacturer or merchant
to designate, the articles to which it. is affixed, as his production.
"The right to a trade-mark is limited only. by the period. of its
use, and ceases only with its abandonment :" per DYER,. J., in
Leidersdorf v. .Flint. This right for an unlimited period has a
positive advantage over a patent, which secures rights i'or only
a limited period, but the privilege, formerly permitted, of affixing
the word "patent" or "patented" to the article, in connection with
which the right to a design has been secured, for the mere device
or mark attached to it, the public being induced to .believe that a
patent exists for the thing itself, has been disallowed by the Registration Act, and very, properly repudiated. The word design,
mentioned in the Patent Act, was obviously intended to constitute
a portion of the manufactured article-either as an - ornamental
adjunct or as controlling its figure or proportions-not as a mere
name or designation by which to distinguish or identify the article:
In re Parker.(Nov. 13th 1877), 11. S. Pat.-Off., Doolittle, Ass't
Coi-; 13 U..S. Pat. Gaz. 323. Held, that a design not intended
to be attached to an article as a distinguishing feature, but being
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itself the article, application should have been mide to patent it
as a design, and the registration of it as a trade-mark was refused.
The registration of a trade-mark is the best evidence of the
intention of the trader to adopt it as the designation of his goods,
but it gives him no better right to its exclusive property than he
possessed before registration. His common-law right, enforceable
both in law and equity, may be further supplemented by any penal
consequences that the statutes of respective states may enact, or,
as in the English Registration Act, the registration itself may
constitute primd facie evidence of his right to the exclusive use
of such trade-mark, and shall, dater the expiration of five years
from the date of such registration, be conclusive evidence of his
right to its exclusive use; or further, his common-law rights may
be subordinated to statutory provisions, not of an ex post facto
character, making registration indispensable, in the case of all
trade-marks assumed or adopted subsequent to the passing of the
act. All this is matter for state legislation, whether as between
citizens of the same state or even aliens; but Congressional legislation is limited to inter-state commerce, foreign commerce and
commerce with the Indian tribes, and quare, whether trade-marks
are comprised within such definitions.
But even the American Registration Act (1870) did not assume
to make registration obligatory, and therefore the decreed unconstitutionality of that act has not effected such confusion in that
respect as might be expected. In Bogers v. -Philip,decided in
1871 (WYLiE, J.), it was held, inter alia, that the plaintiffs, English manufacturers, were not disentitled to protection, by reason
of not having registered their trade-marks in America, under the
U. S. Statute of 1870, since registration was not made obligatory :
Columbia S. Ct., 1 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 29. At this time no registration act existed in England, neither had any declaration of reciprocity between the two countries been entered into. The plaintiffs were remitted to their common-law rights in America, as being
identical with those in England. Indeed, no act of Congress can
destroy those common-law rights, they being state rights and not
national rights. Congress may, perhaps, supplement them and
afford facilities for their exercise in the cause of foreign commerce,
but can neither abridge nor supersede them. Mr. Bishop, in his
work on Criminal- Law, says, "It is an established doctrine of our
courts that we have no national common law :" Wteaton v.-Peters,
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8 Pet. 591-658; .Lorman v. Clarke, 2 McLean 568; -Dawsonv.
Shaver, I Blackf. 204, 205. "There is no clause in the United
States Constitution, nor any act of Congress adopting the common
law as a national system :" Vol. 1, sect. 18. "We can have no
national common law, unless one has been introduced either by the
Constitution itself, or by acts of Congress made in pursuance of
the same constitutional authority: Vol. 1, § 16. "In the language
Of MARSHALL, 0. J.," says the same authority, "when a commonlaw right is asserted, we must look to the state in which the controversy originated :" Wheaton v. Peters, 8upra.
It is feared that the Declaration of Reciprocity, on the subject
of trade-marks, between Great Britain and the United States, can
never be such in pari passu, because Great Britain, being but one
state and having but one legislature, enacts one act for the whole
country, and can dispense with, modify or supersede the common
law-Parliament being all powerful in that respect-whereas the
United States has no power to legislate for the respective states,
and, there being no national common law, the law of the respective states must prevail, and this law somewhat varies in the
different states; for instance, in some of-the older states, a few of
the English statutes, passed subsequently to the settlement, were
adopted, and thus made of force by general consent: Com. v.
Ohapman, 1" Met. 68; Pemble v. COifford, 2 McCord 81; State
v. Bollins, 8 N. H. 550; Sibley v. Williams, 3 Gill & J. 52. In
the younger states such statutory modifications do not exist.
In England, an alien's rights are protected (see Collins & 0o. v.
Cowen, 3 K. & J. 428), the same as in the United States: Taylor
v. Carpenter, before referred to. The right to the exclusive use
of a trade-mark, first asserted in England, in Gout v. Aleplogln,
5 Leg. Obs. 496, and Millington v. Fox, 8 Myl. -& Cr. 838, and
after much discussion, settled by the chancery judges, is now given
by statute. The original statute (Act of 1875, sect. 1) made failure to register fatal, whether the use of trade-mark was old or
new; but by the Act of 1876, where the mark was used before
the original act, but not coming within the definition prescribed
by the act, has been refused registration, the owner is, in default
of registration and upon obtaining a certificate to that effect, only
remitted to his rights as they stood before that act: per Sir R.
MALINS, V.-C., In re Barrows, Law Rep., 5 Ch. Div. 853-59
(March 1st and April 26th 1877.)
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Thus any state in the United States can vary or qualify its
common law, but it is not within the power of Congress so to do.
It appears to the writer (and he submits his opinion with great deference), that no act of Congress can supersede the common law
on the subject of trade-marks, by making registration obligatory
or subsidiary to the assertion of those rights, whether by citizen
or alien, and he submits he is fortified in this view by the hypothetical form of the opinion delivered by the Supreme Court of
the United States itself: "If trade-marks are within congressional
control at all, under the power to regulate commerce," &c. (a
question left undecided by the court).
Happily the right at common law seems to be universally admitted, at least as between Great Britain and the United States,
and that common law is enforceable in the respective states themselves, without the necessity of any registration statute. Even in
the most modern states, the common law prevails, and is in force
in those territories which have been incorporated into states since
the Union: Stout v. Keyes, 2 Doug. (Mich.) 184; Fuller v. The
State, 1 Blackf. 63; State v. Cawood, 2 Stew. 860, 362. Even
if there be an exception to this rule of the prevalence of the common law, as, perhaps, in the states obtained since the Union by
purchase or conquest from foreign nations, the question still remains
whether, in any cae, trade-marks are within congretsional control
at all, under the constitutional power to " regulate commerce among
the several states." The decision of the Supreme Court of the
United States, declaring the unconstitutionality of the acts of
Congress, virtually annuls the treaties, conventions and declarations between the United States and foreign nations, on this subj ect. Such existed between this country and Russia, Belgium,
France, Austria, The German Empire and Great Britain; and
this, at first sight, appears a most serious consequence and likely
to entail most unhappy complications and possible individual
injury. Being reciprocity treaties, the United States can no
longer, in a national sense, fulfil her stipulated part, and cannot of
course expect the foreign countries to fulfil theirs.
So far as Great Britain is concerned, the fear on either side r
rather theoretical than practical. The treaty or declaration with
that country, agreed upon so recently as 1877'is, after all, little
more than an expression or enunciation of the law, which had
long since been acknowledged by both countries, and which still
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survives, irrespective of all treaties, in undiminished force. The
words of the declaration are, that "Subjects or citizens of each of
the contracting parties shall have, in the dominions and possessions
of the other, the same rights as belong to native subjects and citizens,
or as are now granted or may hereafter be granted to the subjects
and citizens of the most favored nation, in everything relating to
property in trade-marks and trade-labels." "It is understood,
that any person who desires to obtain the aforesaid protection must
fulfil the formalities required by the laws of the respective countries."
Bearing in mind the -eses before cited, that aliens' rights were
protected alike in England and the United States before the
existence of the Registration Act in either country, and without
the necessity of any treaty or declaration, but solely by force of
the common law as acknowledged to exist in both countries, citizens
of the United States will be but remitted to their original commonlaw rights in England, and subjects of Great Britain to their like
rights in America, just as where the owners of a trade-mark in
England, if his mark was used before the original Registration
Act, is, in default of registration through no fault of his own, only
remitted to his rights as they stood before the act (Per Sir R.
MALINS, V. C., In re Barrows, Law Rep., 5 Oh. Div. 853-59,
March 1st and April 26th 1877), so an owner who has no formalities
to fulfil in his own country, and upon whom such formalities, even
when they were enjoined, were not even then obligatory (Rodgers
v. Philips,supra), is, in defect of. any provided registration or
formality, only remitted to his original common-law rights. This
may be different in other countries, as for instance France, where
prior to the revolution of 1789 no property in trade-marks existed
at all by the common-law of that country, and everything since
has been defined by code. The same want of common-law recognition of the rights of aliens in all probability prevails throughout
continental Europe, but on this point we do not feel ourselves
competent to express any opinion.
We will conclude with a few references having a general bearing
on the nature of the property in trade-marks and the peculiar
character of that property.
The following California decision appears to commend itself for
its precision and perspicuity: "The right in a trade-mark. is not
limited in its enjoyment by territorial bounds, but may be asserted
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and maintained wherever the common law affords remedies for
wrongs, subject only to such statutory regulations as may properly
be made concerning the use and enjoyment of other property:"
Supreme Court, California, Derringerv. Plate,29 Cal. 292; Coddington's Digest of Trade-marks, sect. 18.
"The fundamental rule," said Lord KiNGSDOWN, "is that one
man has no right to put off his goods as the goods of a rival
trader, and he cannot, therefore, in the language of Lord LANGDALE in the case of Perry v. Truefitt, ' be allowed to use names,
marks, letters or other indicia,by which he may induce purchasers
to believe that the goods which he is selling are the manufacture
of another person:"' In re American Cloth Co. And the same
rule would apply to tradesmen not being manufacturers: (1865)
Y.-C. KINDERSLEY, Glenny v. Smith, 2 Dr. & Sm. 476; s. o.
11 Jurist N. S. 964; s. c.13 L. T. R. (N. S.) 11; s. c. 6 New
R. 363.
But yet the right to the use of a trade-mark is not an abstract
right to which title can be acquired. It is only when such use is
attached to or connected with some particular thing, to which it is
affixed as a designation of individual right in particular property,
that the law will interpose to restrain its use by another : (1869)
Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas, Ferguson v. .Davol Mills,
7 Phila. R. 253; s. c.2 Brewst. 314, and see sects. 126, 127,
148, 149, 152; Coddington's Dig. of Trade-marks, sect. 23.
"An action on the case for deceit, at common law, may be
brought not only by the person who has been induced to purchase
goods manufactured by one maker in the faith that they have been
manufactured by another, but also by the maker of whose manufacture the goods in question have falsely been represented to be.
"It seems at least probable," says Mr. Sebastian, "that this
principle was recognised as early as the reign of Queen Elizabeth.
In Southern v. Howe, Cro. Car. 471; Poph. 144; 2 Rolle 28, a
case was quoted by DODERIDGE, J., to that effect :" Sebastian on
Trade-marks, p. 94.
But an action of this nature must be founded on false representations, made fraudulently, and originally arose out of the commonlaw right to bring an action for a false representation made fraudulently: Per MELLISr, L. J., in Singer Manufacturing Co. v.
Wilson, Law Rep., 2 Ch. Div. 434-53. It differs from ar ordinary action of that nature inasmuch as the common-law courts
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extended the doctrine of false representation in the case of trademarks by giving the original user of the trade-mark, or manufacturer whose mark was imitated, as well as the person or persons
deceived, a right of action against the person thus assuming the
mark; and indeed whether any one was deceived or not, it is sufficient that the counterfeiter was thus enabled to deceive others.
"Such," adds MELLISH, L. J., "was the common-law right;" referring to Sykes v. Sykes, 3 B. & Cr. 541.
"The remedy," said Mr. Justice WILLES, "1is well known. The
prosecutor may file a bill in equity to restrain, or he may bring
an action at law for damages, or he may indict the defendant for
obtaining money under false pretences; B. v. John Smith, D. &
B. 566; 8 Cox 32. But at common law the imitation is not a forgery" Per COCKBURN, C. J., In re B. v. Clos8, D. & B. 460, 7 Cox
494. Also the same opinion was expressed In re J. Smith, supra,
by POLLOCK, C. B., WILLES and BYLES, JJ. and BRAMWELL and
CHANNELL, BB., in the Court of Crown Cases Reserved. Every
facility is afforded, independent of statutes, for the protection of
trade-marks. In the case of an alleged infringement of a true
trade-mark, the plaintiff "has nothing more to do than to show
that the trade-mark has been taken." Per Sir G. JESSEL, M. R.,
in the Singer Manufacturinq Go. v. Wilson, Law Rep., 2 Ch. Div.
434-442; while in a case of false representation which does not
amount to the infringement of a trade-mark proper; "there, as in
every case of fraud, for it must be fraud, the case must be proved."

s. c.
In the United States all former rights, both at law and in equity,
are preserved by sect. 4945, tit. LX., Rev. Stat., c. 2, p. 963,
and as we have seen, in England, they are by no means abridged
by recent ruling of the court, and lest there should be any lingering doubt on the subject of the common-law right of aliens to protection, Rule 5 under the Trade-Mark Registration Act (1875)
provides for the registration of his trade-mark by *any person,
whether a British subject or an alien.
Space will not allow us to cite the very many cases distinguishing
the difference between trade-marks and copyrights or patents, but
the cases, which are numerous, may be found collected and collated
in Upton, Coddington and Sebastian on Trade-Marks. The latter
author, referring to two English cases, Maxwell v. Hogg, Law
Rep., 2 Ch. 307, and Kelly v. Hfutton, Law Rep., 3 Ch. 708,

